

POLICY ISSUES BETWEEN THE US AND WESTERN EUROPE IN THE 1980s

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I. The shaping economic and social forces in Europe today and tomorrow

- will the organization of production, the sharing out of the economic and social product, and economic management have the same overriding importance in the 1980s that they acquired in the 1970s?
- in what ways will the dominating problems (inflation, low growth, access to resources and markets, structural obsolescence) and the potential new advantages (better conservation, new technologies, relative social tranquillity) look different, or, remain essentially the same?
- what will be the dominant trends in the search for more effective approaches to these problems: reassertion of free market principles, social management, neo-corporativism, industrial democracy?
- in what significant ways might new social (or cultural) trends impinge on economic management: e.g., aging populations and generational gaps, retreat from consumerism, quality of life movements, environmental enthusiasms, etc.
- what major divergences could appear among the Europeans as those trends unfold, and with what consequences? might traditional social and economic idiosyncrasies gain new vigor? how would Europeans respond?

II. The international context -- Western Europe's global interests and perspectives in the next decade

- in what ways do we see the changing currents in Europe's internal situation translating into fewer, more, or a different set of interests abroad?
- looking both backward and forward, do the Europeans see their evolving relationships with the rest of the free industrialized world becoming more competitive or more cooperative, or both?
- how do the Europeans perceive developments in the US and in their relations with the US affecting the American dimension in global affairs: a declining but still preeminent factor, competitor but essential partner, recuperable manager of the international system, etc.?

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- how do the Europeans perceive developments in the USSR and Eastern Europe affecting the Soviet dimension in global affairs in the next ten years? As direct or indirect threat, as a competitor in third areas, and as a permanent (if possibly changing) reality to be accommodated within the international system?
- in the Third World, do the Europeans see substantial changes over the next decade in the opportunities available to them there, the threat to their interests, and/or the supportive response that will be required of them?
- given these perspectives, with what psychology (timorous, confident, assertive, independent) and with what guiding concepts of the global order (bipolarism, multipolarism, spheres of influence, condominiums, etc.) will the Europeans of the 1980s approach their international responsibilities?

### III. The security dimension -- alternative emphases in West European security policies

- in what ways, overall, may the Europeans' perceptions of what constitutes the threat to their security, and what constitutes an appropriate defense against that threat, be likely to change in the coming decade?
- will the new elements in the West Europeans' "threat perception" persist, and what impact will they have on traditional Atlantic security institutions and relationships?
- specifically, how will the European concern for "economic security", domestic political stability, and "internal security" affect external military security policies and defense outlays?
- how do the Europeans assess the threat the Soviets are likely to pose both on the Continent and globally, and how do they assess their future vulnerability to threats from a range of other sources especially Third World political volatility and economic underdevelopment? the China factor?
- what kinds of security policies may have increased appeal to the Europeans in the coming ten years, and in what specific ways may they undertake more vigorous efforts to enhance their security? political/economic strategies to modify Soviet behavior and counter Soviet influence? various forms of arms control? regional security systems? modernization programs and extra-Continental capabilities? complements to US activity in Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean? closer French-German cooperation? other forms of shared European security responsibility?
- what do current alliance tensions and these speculations suggest about possible flash points over the coming years in the US-European security relationship? do the Europeans see their security interests as congruent with the US' in areas outside Europe?

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## IV. The emergent political trends in Europe in the 1980s

- are the dominant economic/social forces and international problems more likely to be politically divisive, or supportive of continued political convergence around the social center? major differences among the Europeans in their responses to these pressures?
- whether politically more convergent or more diverging, will European politics provide in the 1980s a more, or a less, favorable climate for the development of challenging movements on the extremes and outside the system?
- is the prospect overall one of a strengthening or of a weakening of the basic elements of the state and instruments of European consensus-building (regional particularism, fragmenting parties, erosion of parliamentary systems, ineffective trade unions, one-issue organizations, media decline -- or the reverse of all these)?
- what will be the likely impact of these economic, social, and political trends on the basic orientation and relative position of traditional party groupings in West European countries?
- in what respects may the political trends and outlook for the Southern Tier countries differ significantly from the European mean?

## V. The prospects for "Europe" -- what "kind" of Western Europe the US will be dealing with in the next decade -- how organized it will be in dealing with its own problems and with the US

- will the number and importance of the interests and problems the Europeans have in common increase or decline in the 1980s?
- will the interests and problems be perceived by the Europeans to be shared? accompanied by sufficient consensus on what to do about them to be supportive of European regional solutions? or will diversities and divergencies be more likely to increase?
- what domestic political configurations are most (or least) likely to favor some kind of "Europe-building"? what set of power relations among the participating states (measured by economic, military, or international stature) is most (or least) likely to be supportive of regional consolidation? the role of personalities?
- how will the international context affect (either negatively or positively) European decisions on whether to try for intra-regional approaches to shared problems and goals? to try to project Europe as an entity in international approaches to shared problems?
- by what alternative (or combination of) means is Europe most likely to move toward more effective consensus-building and decision-making machinery and what are the obstacles to each?

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## VI. Potential areas of convergence and conflict with the US

- do we see Western Europe and the US confronting essentially the same economic and social problems or substantially different ones, and does convergence or divergence of problems auger convergence or conflict of policies?
- in what ways may the Europeans' political responses to their internal problems be expected to differ from and perhaps run counter to those of the US, taking into account not only projected political trends, but also institutional differences, historical traditions, etc.?
- should we anticipate a growing compatibility (or incompatibility) in Europe's and the US' global perceptions -- of each other, the industrialized free world, the Third World, and the USSR -- that will facilitate (or greatly complicate) the achievement of common approaches toward each other and third areas?
- in light of these perceptions, what are the most likely sources of policy differences and conflict between us: economic competition, diverging political priorities, sharing of burdens, leadership roles, competitive spheres of influence, tactical differences, conflicting concepts of long-range goals and desirable outcomes?
- given the likelihood of both continuity and evolution in West European political institutions, how do we assess the adequacy of Atlantic and international machinery to achieve the basic minimum of compatibility and collaboration between us? Is the machinery likely itself to become an obstacle to accommodation?
- what order of priority will common security concerns be likely to retain in the evolution of trans-Atlantic relationships in the 1980s and in what ways are those concerns likely to be different?
- given those security concerns and priorities, what will likely be the principal sources of difference and conflict between us: different threat perceptions, declining mutual confidence, burden sharing, mix of defense vs. arms control, NATO's area of competence, arms modernization and procurement, alternative security systems?